篇一：一篇经济类英文论文(含中文翻译)
The Problem of Social Cost
社会成本问题
RONALD COASE
罗纳德·科斯
Ronald Coase is Professor Emeritus at University of Chicago LawSchool and a Nobel Laureate in Economics. This article is fromThe Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960). Several passages devoted to extended discussions of legal decisions
have been omitted.
罗纳德·科斯在芝加哥大学法学院名誉教授和诺贝尔经济学奖得主。本文是其外法学与经济学杂志（1960年10月）。专门的法律问题的决定的延伸讨论的几个
段落已被省略。
I. THE PROBLEM TO BE EXAMINED
This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harm-ful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economies of Welfare. The conclusion to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory li-able for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others). It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.
一、要检查的问题
本文关注的是这些行动的企业有伤害他人有用的影响。标准的例子是，一个工厂的烟雾从那些占领邻近物业的有害影响。在这种情况下的经济分析，通常已在工厂的私人和社会产品之间的分歧方面着手，在经济学家们基本上遵循治疗庇古福利经济。这种分析的结论，似乎使大多数经济学家是工厂里的烟雾，或者受伤的人造成的损害能够使雇主，这将是可取的，上放置一个税在金钱方面的损害，或最后，它会导致排除住宅区（大概是从其他地区排放的烟雾将有对他人有害影响）工厂厂主不同的金额产生的烟雾，相当于。行动的建议的课程是不合适的，因为它们导致的结果是不一定，甚至是通常情况下，可取的，它是我的论点。
II. THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be
made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to, B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm. I instanced in my previous article the case of a confectioner the noise and vibrations from whose machinery disturbed a doctor in his work. To avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confectioner. The problem posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while, as a result of restricting the methods of production which could be used by the confectioner, to secure more doctoring at the cost of a reduced supply of confectionery products. Another example is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which destroy crops on neighbouring land. If it is inevitable that some cattle will stray, all increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is clear: meat or crops. What answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value of what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it. To give another example, Professor George J. Stigler instances the contamination of a stream. If we assume that the harmful effect of the pollution is that it kills the fish, the question to be decided is: is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the value of the product which the contamination of the stream makes possible. It goes almost without saying that this problem has to be looked at in total and at the margin.
二、互惠性的问题
传统的做法往往掩盖作出的选择，自然。这个问题通常被认为作为一个在B上一个敌人造成的伤害和什么要决定的是：我们应该如何抑制一个？但这是错误的。我们正在处理的互惠性质的问题。为了避免伤害，B将A上造成的危害，真正的问题，必须决定是：应该允许A损害B或应允许B伤害吗？问题是要避免更严重的伤害。我在我以前的文章中实例化一个糕点师的噪音和振动机械不安医生在他的工作情况。为了避免伤及医生会造成伤害的糕点。基本上这种情况下所造成的问题是它是否值得，作为一种限制方法可以用于糕点生产的结果，以争取更多的糖果产品的供应减少，成本篡改。另一个例子是给予由偏离破坏邻近土地上的农作物的牛的问题。如果这是不可避免的，一些牛会偏离，只能获得所有的肉类供应增加作物供应减少开支。选择的性质是明确的：肉类或农作物。应给予什么样的答案是，当然，不明确的，除非我们知道得到什么价值，以及什么牺牲得到它的价值。给另一个例如，教授乔治·J.斯蒂格勒实例流的污染。如果我们假定污染的有害影响是，它杀死的鱼，将要决定的问题是：是鱼的价值损失大于或小于流的污染，使产品的价值。当然，几乎没有说，这个问题要看着总保证金。
III. THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
I propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a compeletely satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly (strictly this means that the operation of a pricing system is
without cost).
A good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by the case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighbouring land. Let us sup-pose that a farmer and cattle-raiser are operating on neighbouring properties. Let us further suppose that, without any fencing between the properties, an increase in the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd increases the total damage to the farmer’s crops. What happens to the marginal damage as the size of the herd increases is another matter. This depends on whether the cattle tend to follow one another or to roam side by side, on whether they tend to be more or less restless as the size of the herd increases and on other similar factors. For my immediate purpose, it is immaterial what assumption is made about marginal damage as the size of the herd increases.
Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused, the additional annual cost imposed on the cattle-raiser if he increased his herd from, say, 2 to 3 steers is $3 and in deciding on the size of the herd, he will take this into account along with his other costs. That is, he will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced (assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters the cattle) is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the value of the additional crops destroyed. Of course, if, by the employment of dogs, herdsmen, aeroplanes, mobile radio and other means, the amount of damage can be reduced, these means will be adopted when their cost is less than the value of the crop which they prevent being lost. Given that the annual cost of fencing is $9, the cattle-raiser who wished to have a herd with 4 steers or more would pay for fencing to be erected and maintained, assuming that other means of attaining the same end would not do so more cheaply. When the fence is erected, the marginal cost due to the liability for damage becomes zero, except to the extent that an increase in the size of the herd necessitates a stronger and therefore more expensive fence because more steers are liable to lean against it at the same time. But, of course, it may be cheaper for the cattle-raiser not to fence and to pay for the damaged crops, as in my arithmetical example, with 3 or fewer steers.
It might be thought that the fact that the cattle-raiser would pay for all crops damaged would lead the farmer to increase his planting if a cattle-raiser came to occupy the neighbouring property. But this is not so. If the crop was previously sold in conditions of perfect competition, marginal cost was equal to price for the amount of planting undertaken and any expansion would have reduced the profits of the farmer. In the new situation, the existence of crop damage would mean that the farmer would sell less on the open market but his receipts for a given production would remain the same, since the cattle-raiser would pay the market price for any crop damaged. Of course, if cattle-raising commonly involved the destruction of crops, the coming into existence of a cattle-raising industry might raise the price of the crops involved and farmers would then extend their planting. But I wish to confine my attention to the individual farmer.
I have said that the occupation of a neighbouring property by a cattle-raiser would not cause the amount of production, or perhaps more exactly the amount of planting, by the farmer to increase. In fact, if the cattle-raising has any effect, it will be to decrease the amount of planting. The reason for this is that, for any given tract of land, if the value of the crop damaged is so great that the receipts from the sale of the undamaged crop are less than the total costs of cultivating that tract of land, it will be profitable for the farmer and the cattle-raiser to make a bargain whereby that tract of land is left uncultivated. This can be made clear by means of an arithmetical example. Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is $12 and that the cost incurred in cultivating this tract of land is $10, the net gain from cultivating the land being $2. I assume for purposes of simplicity that the farmer owns the land. Now assume that the cattle-raiser starts operations on the neighbouring property and that the value of the crops damaged is $1.In this case $11 is obtained by the farmer from sale on the market and $1 is obtained from the cattle-raiser for damage suffered and the net gain remains $2. Now suppose that the cattle-raiser finds it profitable to increase the size of his herd, even though the amount of damage rises to $3; which means that the value of the additional meat production is greater than the additional costs, including the additional $2 payment for damage. But the total payment for damage is now $3. The net gain to the farmer from cultivating the land is still $2. The cattle-raiser would be better off if the farmer would agree not to cultivate his land for any payment less than $3. The farmer would be agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment greater than $2. There is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory bargain which would lead to the abandonment of cultivation. * But the same argument applies not only to the whole tract cultivated by the fanner but also to any subdivision of it. Suppose, for example, that the cattle have a well-defined route, say, to a brook or to a shady area. In these circumstances, the amount of damage to the crop along the route may well be great and if so, it could be that the farmer and the cattle-raiser would find it profitable to make a bargain whereby the farmer would agree not to cultivate this strip of land.
But this raises a further possibility. Suppose that there is such a well de-fined route. Suppose further that the value of the crop that would be obtained by cultivating this strip of land is $10 but that the cost of cultivation is $11. In the absence of the cattle-raiser, the land would not be cultivated. However, given the presence of the cattle-raiser, it could well be that if the strip was cultivated, the whole crop would be destroyed by the cattle. In which case, the cattle-raiser would be forced to pay $10 to the farmer. It is true that the farmer would lose $1. But the cattle-raiser would lose $10. Clearly this is a situation which is not likely to last indefinitely since neither party would want this to happen. The aim of the farmer would be to induce the cattle-raiser to make a payment in return for an agreement to leave this land uncultivated. The farmer would not be able to obtain a payment greater than the cost of fencing off this piece of land nor so high as to lead the cattle-raiser to abandon the use of the neighbouring property. What payment would in fact be made would depend
on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle-raiser as bargain-ers. But as the payment would not be so high as to cause the cattle-raiser to abandon this location and as it would not vary with the size of the herd, such an agreement would not affect the allocation of resources but would merely alter the distribution of income and wealth as between the cattle-raiser and the farmer.
I think it is clear that if the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly, the reduction in the value of production elsewhere will be taken into account in computing the additional cost involved in increasing the size of the herd. This cost will be weighed against the value of the additional meat production and, given perfect competition in the cattle industry, the allocation of resources in cattle-raising will be optimal. What needs to be emphasized is that the fall in the value of production elsewhere which would be taken into account in the costs of the cattle-raiser may well be less than the damage which the cattle would cause to the crops in the ordinary course of events. This is because it is possible, as a result of market transactions, to discontinue cultivation of the land. This is desirable in all cases in which the damage that the cattle would cause, and for which the cattle-raiser would be willing to pay, exceeds the amount which the farmer would pay for use of the land. In conditions of perfect competition, the amount which the farmer would pay for the use of the land is equal to the difference between the value of the total production when the factors are employed on this land and the value of the additional product yielded in their next best use (which would be what the farmer would have to pay for the factors). If damage exceeds the amount the farmer would pay for the use of the land, the value of the additional product of the factors employed elsewhere would exceed the value of the total product in this use after damage is taken into account. It follows that it would be desirable to abandon cultivation of the land and to release the factors employed for production elsewhere. A procedure which merely provided for payment for damage to the crop caused by the cattle but which did not allow for the possibility of cultivation being discontinued would result in too small an employment of factors of production in cattle-raising and too large an employment of factors in cultivation of the crop. But given the possibility of market transactions, a situation in which damage to crops exceeded the rent of the land would not endure. Whether the cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or himself rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount slightly greater than the farmer would pay (if the farmer was himself renting the land), the final result would be the same and would maximise the value of production. Even when the farmer is induced to plant crops which it would not be profitable to cultivate for sale on the market, this will be a purely short-term phenomenon and may be expected to lead to an agreement under which the planting will cease. The cattle-raiser will remain in that location and the marginal cost of meat production will be the same as before, thus having no long-run effect on the allocation of resources.
三、损害赔偿责任的定价制度
篇二：经济学毕业论文英文文献及翻译1
Jayati Ghosh The green barrier to free trade
C. P. Chandrasekhar
Jayati Ghosh
AT THE END of the latest round of meetings of the agricultural
negotiations committee of the WTO, the optimism that negotiators would meet the March 31 deadline for working out numerical
targets, formulas and other "modalities" through which countries can frame their liberalisation自由化，放宽 commitments承诺，财政义务 in a new full-fledged成熟的 round of trade negotiations has almost disappeared. That target was important for two reasons. First, it is now becoming clear, that even more than was true during the Uruguay Round, forging an agreement in the agricultural area is bound to prove extremely difficult.
Progress in the agricultural negotiations was key to persuading the unconvinced that a new `Doha Round' of trade negotiations is useful and feasible.
Second, the Doha declaration made agricultural negotiations one part of a `single undertaking' to be completed by January 1, 2005.
That is, in a take `all-or-nothing' scheme, countries had to arrive at, and be bound by, agreements in all areas in which negotiations
were to be initiated in the new round. This means that if agreement is not worked out with regard to agriculture, there would be no
change in the multilateral trade regime governing industry, services or related areas and no progress in new areas, such as competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement, all of which are crucial to the economic agenda of the developed countries.
The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime.
There are substantial differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich and the powerful disagree, a global
consensus is not easy to come by.
But that is not all. Even if an agreement is stitched up between the rich nations, through manoeuvres such as the Blair House accord, getting the rest of the world to go along would be more difficult this time.
This is because the outcomes in the agricultural trade area since
the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) began have fallen far short of expectations. In the course of Round, advocates of the UR regime had promised global production adjustments that would increase the value of world agricultural trade and an increase in developing country share of such trade
中文翻译：
题目：自由贸易中的绿色壁垒（The green barrier to free trade）
作者：C. P. Chandrasekhar 、Jayati Ghosh
绿色壁垒的自由贸易
处长钱德拉塞卡
Jayati戈什
在A完自由化的承诺在其最新一轮会议的农业谈判委员会，世界贸易组织，乐观地认为，谈判的框架将在3月31日最后期限为制定数字指标，公式和其他“方式，哪些国家可以”通过新的全面谈判回合贸易几乎已经消失。 这一目标是重要的原因有两个。
第一，它现在越来越清楚，那更是在报道比乌拉圭回合谈判，达成协议，建立一个地区的农业必然是极为困难的证明。
在农业谈判进展的关键是说服不相信一个新的`多哈回合谈判中对贸易是有益的，可行的。
第二，多哈宣言作出承诺的农业谈判的一部分单从`要完成2005年1月1日。 也就是说，在采取'全有或没有什么计划，国家已经达成，并约束，是协议中的所有领域中的谈判将要开展的新一轮谈判。 这意味着，如果协议不能进行农业合作方面，将不会有政权更替的多边贸易行业管理，服务或相关的领域，外国采购和公共投资在没有取得任何进展的新领域，如竞争政策，所有其中至为重要，发达国家经济议程的。
点上的因素使这次农业的坚持是多方面的。 由于在最后一轮，有一点是一致的贸易体制中的农业发达国家的全球自己在适当的形状。
农产品出口有很大的差异在议程中的美国，凯恩斯集团和欧盟国家内部的发展。 当富人和强大的反对，一个全球性的共识是不容易找到。
但这还不是全部。 即使协议被缝了贫富之间的国家，通过演习，如布莱尔大厦协议，得到了世界各地的去沿着这将是更加困难的时间。这是因为协议开始对农业（农业协定）的成果）在农产品贸易领域实施以来，乌拉圭回合（乌拉圭回合的状况远远没有达到人们的期望。 乌拉圭回合的谈判过程中，政权主张乌拉圭回合的承诺，全球生产了调整，将增加世界农产品贸易
的价值，以及在发展贸易的增加等国分享
篇三：经济类外文文献
外文文献原文
Improve the concept of financial supervision in rural areas Farmers in China's vast population, has some large-scale production of the farmers, but also survival-oriented farmers, huge differences between the financial needs of rural finance intermediation makes complex, together with agriculture itself is the profit low, natural and market risks high risk decision to weak agricultural industry characteristics, resulting in the cost of rural financial transactions is far higher than the city, also decided to organize the rural financial system in terms of operation or in the market has its own special characteristics. 20 years of financial refor, financial development while the Chinese city made impressive achieveme-nts, but the rural finance is the entire financial system is still the weakest link.Insufficient supply of rural finance,competition is not sufficient,farmers and agricultural enterprises in getting loans and other issues is alsovery prominent, backward rural financial system can no longer effectively support the development of modern agriculture or the transformation of traditional agriculture and the building of new socialist countryside,which to improve the rural financial supervision new topic.
China's rural financial regulatory problems
(A) the formation of China's financial regulatory system had "a line three commission " (People's Bank,the Securities Regulatory Commission,Insurance Regulatory Commission and the Banking Regulatory Commission) financial regulatory structure.
Bank These stringent requirements,different management and diversification of monitoring has its positive role,but it also had some negative effects.First,inefficient supervision,supervision of internal consumption of high costs,limited financial industry business development and innovation space.Second,the regulatory agencies,regulatory bodies and the information asymmetry between central banks,banking, securities,and insurance mechanisms of coordination between regulatory bodies are not perfect.Information between central banks and regulatory agencies is difficult to share,is difficult to create effective monitoring forc. Basically between the various regulators in their respective state regulators,regulatory policies and measures to overlapping or conflicting phenomena have occurred,unable to cope with China's current rural financial market complexity and diversity and so on.Third,financial institutions have liquidity risk or out of the market and so on,may be excessive because the central bank assistance,financial institutions and financial institutions led to the person in charge "capacity risk" and "moral
hazard",or for financial institutions regulatory arbitrage possibilities;addition,since the lack of recourse,may adversely affect the financial stability.
(B) rural financial ecological environment is not in-depth
The current financial environment in rural county building still remains in the letter the uservillage,township,community development credit level, "government-led,human-propelled,departmental interaction" and create a mechanism for financial ecological environment in rural areas lack.Local governments and authorities the importance of financial knowledge of the ecological environment is not deep,implementation and functions of individual local protectionism and heavy,there is interference with the financial sector credit and other daily business situation.Rural credit system lag,lack of bad credit punishment mechanism, rural businesses and residents in the overall credit awareness is not high,rural finance development and expansion of social services and social protection of the environment has not yet formed.
(C) China's existing legal system of financial supervision and a number of shortcomings,can not guarantee that financial regulation is reasonable, effective, standardized implementation.
First,regulatory lag,supporting regulations are incomplete,the content is too rough,too simple,the banking,securities and insurance supervision laws and regulations more old,a general lack of quantitative science.Supervisory regulations and standards, regulatory methods and technical means not meet regulatory requirements in the market. Staff in the actual implementation, not easy to grasp the scale, may of operation. Second, the Chinese regulators and the regulated objects exist some interest, and the existing regulations, lack of supervision and regulatory enforcement are to ensure that financial regulation can not be just and reasonable. Finally, China's financial supervision is still difficult to shake off the inertia of the executive-style regulatory impact.
(D) of the Rural Financing drifting outside the existing financial regulatory
According to IFAD study, Chinese farmers from the informal financial institutions, loans from official credit institutions about 4 times. For farmers, the importance of informal financial markets over the formal financial market. China's mainly rural folk form of finance rural credit cooperatives, Cooperation, private lending, private banks, private funds, microfinance, etc., of which only rural credit cooperatives and microfinance in China's financial supervision under the rest of the financial forms the lack of appropriate supervision. The general lack of rural
financial organizations of civil norms, there is a big risk, China's existing laws and regulations on private financial institutions in rural areas is one of "isolation" policy, making a lot of money from the dark into the rural financial market and greater regulation of financial difficulty, on rural financial security is a potential threat.
learn from the developed countries
(A) improve coordination of rural finance mechanisms for external supervision
1. The United States "multiple composite" of the coordination mechanism. U.S. financial cooperation system in rural areas by the federal mid-term credit banks, cooperative banks, federal land banks and federal land bank system composed of three Cooperatives, the Farm Credit Administration (NCUA) leadership, and with the Council under the leadership of the private banks in rural commercial credit, National Rural Credit Bank policy of the United States shared the task of rural financial intermediation. The organizational model is a typical multi-mode hybrid system, three systems have an independent management system, with clear terms of reference. To ensure the healthy development of rural financial institutions, commercial banks in the United States adopted a different regulatory models, specifically setting up a relatively sound financial regulatory system in rural areas, including regulators, industry self-regulation associations, financial intermediation and mutual insurance group clearing center, the four kind of independent agencies and their subsidiary bodies, the functions of different, but share the same objectives as a common rural cooperative financial institutions to serve the regulatory system.
2. Germany's "comprehensive regulatory model" of coordination mechanisms. Low concentration of the German banking system, in the very important parts of the bank, the representative of the financial mixed operation. Commonwealth Bank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority the power to regulate the two main regulators of the banking sector there is a clear division of labor, but also close cooperation. Commonwealth Bank in Germany, nine states have branch offices, using their own network advantages to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for daily transmission of data banks focus for the Federal Financial Authority to provide a better basis for the exercise of regulatory functions, but it is not directly involved in the regulation work, nor has the administrative punishment. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority did not have branches in the states, it is difficult to carry out regular supervision, need to cooperate with the Commonwealth Bank to perform its regulatory functi
ons. Germany's main central banks and industry rely on the federal audit of the regulatory system and risk prevention and protection system to ensure rural finance in the specification on the basis of continuous development.
3. Japan's "complement each other-type" coordination mechanism. In Japan, the dual supervision of the implementation of rural finance: first, the Office of Government financial regulation, supervision on the implementation of various financial institutions, to achieve the overall risk control; Second, national and local Forestry and Fisheries Department with the Office of Financial Regulation on the implementation of rural financial institutions supervision, including the Ministry of Agriculture consists of the branch on Norinchukin supervision, Forestry and Fisheries set up in six major areas of agricultural area in County Council on joint supervision of the letter, and all, Road House, County Farmer of the Ministry of Agriculture within its jurisdiction Association for Cooperative Finance Supervision Department
(B) the establishment of deposit insurance and emergency rescue system to form a three-tier safety net
Developed financial system generally established strict internal management system, deposit insurance system and the system of three emergency safety net. As a second-class safety net of deposit insurance system has been very satisfactory. The federal government on rural finance unified compulsory deposit insurance, the specific business operation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's SavingsAssociation Insurance Fund, and to assume supervision of the insured financial institutions; the German government on the implementation of the voluntary deposit of credit co-insurance, not mandatory insurance, its insurance sector is the industry organization; Japan's credit co-national compulsory deposit insurance, the insurance agency is a joint venture between Government and the people, by the Government, Norinchukin Bank, Japan Bank, Credit Union and a coalition of agricultural water fishery credit cooperatives Industry Insurance Agency. As a third-class safety net for emergency rescue system, specific measures for implementation in different countries, bank deposits for the brink of bankruptcy, in some countries directly by the central bank to offer special low-interest loans (such as the U.S. and Italy), in some countries by the bank regulatory authorities and other Commercial Bank for the establishment of special institutions to finance the rescue (such as France and Belgium), a number of countries came forward by the deposit insurance agency to provide funds (such as Japan), more by one or a few large banks in support of official support.
(C) rural finance within the industry associations to play a regulatory role
1. U.S. Rural Cooperative Finance Association of self-management. In the United States, various credit associations or co-finance up to several dozen, including a long history, nationally renowned for the National Association of Credit (CUNA), a specialized credit services for the Federal Register Association (NAFCU), there are also special school credit for community service credit unions and associations (CCUC), etc.. While the states also have their own Credit Union Association. The trade association is one of the major work to develop a code of conduct, self-regulation management.
2. German credit cooperation and other cooperative system of industry self-regulation of mutual integration. German cooperation in the National Credit Union (BVR) is a cooperative bank industry self-regulatory organizations, grass-roots local cooperative banks, cooperative banks and district central cooperative banks, as well as professional co-finance companies, cooperative credit union is a member. Germany 11 contributions from the various types of cooperatives set up jointly organized a regional cooperative audit association, responsible for annual audit of the specialized agencies of the various types of cooperatives, which are also common types of cooperatives at the district level, the industry watchdog, plays an important industry supervisory role.
3. Set supervision and service in one of the Japanese Agricultural Association. Japanese government in 1947 promulgated the "Agricultural Cooperative Law," agricultural association provides services for members of cooperative organizations, its not for profit, adhere to the rural communities and members for the service centers, institutional system based on grass-roots level according to facilitate farmers , established the principle manageable. The main source of funding is to absorb the rural deposits, in principle, limited to serving as a member of the farmers and agricultural groups. To ensure financial security cooperation, and healthy run, set up a rural credit insurance, temporary transfers of funds mutual aid system and credit cooperative organizations, and government co-funded deposit insurance system, agricultural disaster compensation system and the agricultural credit guarantee system for the insurance system measures.
improve the financial supervision of the concept of rural China
(A) improve and perfect the legal system of rural financial regulation, supervision according to law
《急求经济类3000字左右英文文献(带翻译更好》
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